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ABSTRACT  
To address the neurocognitive mechanisms that underlie choices made after receiving 
information from an anonymous individual, reaction times (Experiment 1) and event-related 
brain potentials (Experiment 2) were recorded as participants played 3 variants of the Coin Toss 
game. In this game, participants guess the outcomes of unseen coin tosses after a person in 
another room (dubbed “the reporter”) observes the coin toss outcomes and then sends reports 
(which may or may not be truthful) to participants about whether the coins landed on heads or 
tails. Participants knew that the reporter's interests either were aligned with their own (Common 
Interests), opposed to their own (Conflicting Interests), or opposed to their own but that the 
reporter was penalized every time he or she sent a false report about the coin toss outcome 
(Penalty for Lying). In the Common Interests and Penalty for Lying conditions, participants 
followed the reporter’s reports over 90% of the time, in contrast to less than 59% of the time in 
the Conflicting Interests condition.  Reaction time results indicated that participants took similar 
amounts of time to respond in the Common Interests and Penalty for Lying conditions and that 
they were reliably faster than in the Conflicting Interests condition. Event-related potentials 
(ERPs) timelocked to the reporter's reports revealed a larger P2, P3, and LPC response in the 
Common Interests condition than in the other two, suggesting that participants’ brains processed 
the reporter’s reports differently in the Common Interests condition, relative to the other two 
conditions.  Results suggest that even when people behave as if they trust information, they 
consider communicative efforts of individuals whose interests are aligned with their own to be 
slightly more informative than those of individuals who are made trustworthy by an institution, 
such as a penalty for lying.   
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According to a Chinese proverb, “A wise man makes his own decisions, an ignorant man 
follows the public opinion.” Unfortunately, as citizens in modern democracies, we do not always 
have enough time, energy, and information to make independent decisions. Thus, in many 
political, legal, and economic contexts, citizens must make decisions based on the statements of 
other people (Lupia & McCubbins, 1998; Lupia, 1992, 1994; Mondak, 1993; Sniderman Brody 
& Tetlock, 1991; Boudreau, 2006). For example, when choosing among different candidates for 
office, uninformed citizens must often base their decisions on the statements of politicians and 
the endorsements of interest groups. When deciding a question at a trial, jurors must rely upon 
the statements of competing attorneys and witnesses. Similarly, when choosing among products, 
consumers often rely on information provided by endorsers, such as Consumer Reports and the 
Better Business Bureau, as well as information provided by the sellers themselves. In making 
such decisions, people must evaluate information gleaned from people they do not personally 
know, and whose interests may or may not be aligned with their own. 
Most research on the neural basis of decision-making has focused on the neurocognitive 
mechanisms of reward processing, especially learning, and the way in which individuals 
modulate their behavior based on their evaluation of the outcomes of prior decisions (e.g. 
Knutson & Bossaerts, 2007; Wickens, Horvitz, Costa, & Killcross, 2007).  Only recently have 
cognitive neuroscientists begun to reckon with the fact that a major source of uncertainty in 
human decision-making derives from the fact that decisions are made in social and institutional 
contexts. In neuroeconomics, for example, researchers have investigated the neural responses 
associated with cooperation and competition between people as they engage in interactive 
economic games, such as the ultimatum game (Sanfey et al., 2003), the prisoner’s dilemma 
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(Rilling et al., 2004), and the trust game (McCabe et al., 2001; Zak et al., 2004; de Quervain et 
al., 2004; Delgado et al., 2005).  
Such studies have shown that the brain treats money much as it does more biologically 
basic reinforcers, so that performance in social economic games can be partially explained by 
activity in the reward systems of the brain. For example, the decision to trust another individual 
has been linked to levels of the neuropeptide oxytocin (Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak, Fischbacher, & 
Fehr, 2005). The reciprocation of one’s trust by another person results in greater striatal 
activation than does “reciprocation” by a computer, suggesting that – over and above any 
financial benefits – interaction with a cooperative agent is itself rewarding (Rilling, et al. 2002; 
Rilling et al., 2004). Further, when people engage in multiple rounds of the same economic 
exchange game, activity in the caudate nucleus is positively correlated with the recognition of 
benevolent reciprocity by one’s partner, as well as with subsequent trusting behavior, i.e. 
awarding one’s partner a larger sum of money in the next round of play (King-Casas, Tomlin, 
Camerer, Quartz, & Montague, 2005).  
However, what happens when people exchange information with one another rather than 
money? In such anonymous exchanges, what are the conditions under which citizens can trust 
the statements of others in order to pursue their goals? In the present study, we address the 
cognitive and neural mechanisms that underlie choices made after receiving information from 
another individual. Our design is motivated by formal models in political science and economics 
that demonstrate the conditions under which people first, trust the statements of individuals 
personally unknown to them (dubbed “reporters” throughout this paper), and second, base their 
decisions on the statements of these reporters. Specifically, mathematical models by Crawford 
and Sobel (1982) and Lupia and McCubbins (1998) demonstrate that, in equilibrium, common 
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interests between a knowledgeable reporter and citizens induce the reporter to tell the truth, and 
the citizens to trust the reporter’s statements and base their choices upon them.  However, when a 
knowledgeable reporter and citizens have conflicting interests, these models suggest that citizens 
should ignore the reporter’s statements and make their decisions on their own (Lupia & 
McCubbins, 1998). Lupia and McCubbins (1998) have also shown that institutions can 
sometimes induce a reporter to tell the truth, even when his or her interests conflict with those of 
citizens. For example, an appropriately large penalty for lying can remove a reporter’s incentive 
to lie, and lead citizens to trust the reporter’s statements (Lupia & McCubbins, 1998). 
Lupia and McCubbins (1998) tested their game theoretic model in a series of behavioral 
experiments involving two kinds of participants: reporters and listeners. In those experiments, 
listeners were asked to guess the outcome of an unseen coin toss, and they were told that a 
person unknown and unseen to them (i.e., “the reporter”) would observe the coin toss outcome 
and send a report (which may or may not be truthful) to them about whether the coin landed on 
heads or tails. The presence of common versus conflicting interests was varied by manipulating 
the financial incentives of both types of participants. In all conditions, the reporters earned 
money based on the listeners’ performance, while the listeners earned money based on their own 
performance. For example, in the common interests condition, listeners were told that both they 
and the reporter earned money when the listener correctly guessed the outcome of the coin toss. 
In the conflicting interests condition, listeners were told that they would earn money when they, 
themselves, guessed correctly, but that the reporter would earn money only when the listeners 
guessed incorrectly.  As predicted, reporters were much more likely to send truthful reports in 
the common than the conflicting interests condition (Lupia & McCubbins, 1998). Further, 
listeners who perceived that the reporter shared common interests with them were significantly 
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more likely to trust the reporter’s statements than those who perceived that the reporter’s 
interests conflicted with their own.  
A third condition, the penalty for lying condition, was similar to the conflicting interests 
condition in that reporters earned money whenever listeners guessed incorrectly. However, 
reporters lost money whenever their reports to the listener were not truthful.  In some settings, 
the penalty for lying was double the amount that reporters could earn for an incorrect response 
by the listener, so reporters in this condition were for the most part truthful in their reports to the 
listeners.  Additionally, the listeners trusted the reporter’s statements at a rate that was similar to 
that in the common interests condition.1 Based upon these theoretical and experimental results, 
Lupia and McCubbins (1998) concluded that institutions can substitute for common interests 
because they, too, induce the reporter to make truthful statements and enable citizens to trust and 
learn from these statements. 
Here we present two experiments that test the model presented by Lupia and McCubbins 
(1998). In Experiment 1, we collected reaction times from listeners in Lupia and McCubbins’s 
coin toss game, and found that participants took a similar amount of time to respond to reporters 
with common interests and reporters in the Penalty for Lying condition. Moreover, reaction 
times in these two conditions were reliably faster than in the Conflicting Interests condition. In 
Experiment 2, we recorded event-related potentials (ERPs) from listeners in the coin toss game 
as they processed information conveyed by anonymous reporters whose trustworthiness was 
determined by these social conditions.  Results indicated that participants’ brains processed 
reports differently in the Common Interests condition, relative to the other two conditions. 
                                                 
1
 Lupia and McCubbins (1998) also tested the effects of other external forces, such as the threat 
of verification by a third party and costly effort by the reporter. 
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EXPERIMENT 1   
As in Lupia and McCubbins’s (1998) study, participants in Experiment 1 were asked to 
predict the outcomes of coin tosses that happened in a separate room.  They were instructed that 
they would earn 50 cents for each correct prediction that they made, and nothing when they 
made an incorrect prediction. They were then told that a participant in another room (i.e., “the 
reporter”) would observe each coin toss outcome and then send a report to them via computer 
about whether the coin landed on heads or tails.  Participants were also told that the reporter 
could either lie about the coin toss outcome or tell the truth.  Thus, before participants made a 
prediction about each coin toss, they observed the reporter’s report of whether the coin landed on 
heads or tails, but did not know whether the report was truthful. 
As in Lupia and McCubbins (1998), the key factor that was manipulated in the present 
study was the perceived trustworthiness of the reporter.  To do so, two things were varied:  the 
interests of the reporter and the participants, as well as the institutional context in which the 
reporter sent his or her report. In the Common Interests condition, participants were told that 
they would earn 50 cents each time they correctly predicted the coin toss outcome and that the 
reporter would also earn 50 cents each time participants correctly predicted the coin toss 
outcome.  Participants were also instructed that neither they nor the reporter would earn any 
money when they (the participants) made an incorrect prediction.   
In the Conflicting Interests condition, participants were told that they still earned 50 cents 
each time they made a correct prediction. However, they were also told that the reporter now 
earned 50 cents each time they (the participants) made an incorrect prediction about the coin toss 
outcome, and earned nothing each time they (the participants) made a correct prediction. 
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In the Penalty for Lying condition, conflicting interests between the reporter and the 
participants were maintained, but an institution was also imposed upon the reporter—namely, a 
penalty for lying.  Specifically, participants were told that $1 would be subtracted from the 
reporter’s experimental earnings each time that he or she lied about the coin toss outcome.  
Because participants were told how the reporter earned money, they should in principle know 
that the $1 penalty would ensure that the reporter always had an incentive to tell the truth about 
the coin toss outcome. 
 
METHODS 
Participants 
 Forty-seven adults from the University of California, Davis community (29 men), aged 
18 to 26, were paid based on the decisions that they made in our experiment.  All participants 
were healthy, and they earned, on average, 27 dollars. 
 
Procedure  
 Upon entry into the experimental lab, participants were asked to predict whether several 
practice coin tosses landed on heads or tails, and were paid 50 cents for each correct prediction 
that they made.  The purpose of these practice predictions was to ensure that participants 
understood that they would earn money based upon the choices they made in the experiment. 
Following these initial coin tosses, participants were read the instructions for the 
Common Interests condition. Participants were told that a coin would be flipped in a different 
room and shown to another, anonymous experimental participant who was referred to as the 
reporter. Upon seeing the outcome of the coin flip, the reporter would respond either HEADS or 
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TAILS, and this message would appear on the computer monitor in front of the participant. 
Participants were told that they and the reporter would earn 50 cents every time they, the 
participants, correctly predicted the coin toss outcome, and nothing if they predicted incorrectly 
or failed to respond before the onset of the next trial. Participants were explicitly told that it was 
entirely the decision of the reporter as to whether he or she would send a truthful report via the 
computer. 
Although participants were told that there was another person acting as “the reporter” in 
another room, the reporter’s reports of heads or tails in each experimental block were actually 
based upon Lupia and McCubbins’s (1998) results and were, thus, programmed into the 
computer before the experiment began.  That said, many precautions were taken to ensure that 
participants believed that there was another person acting as the reporter.  For example, the 
experimenter left the experimental laboratory between blocks, ostensively to make sure the 
reporter was ready to begin the next set of trials.  The amount of time that it took for the 
reporter’s reports to appear on participants’ computer screen was long enough for us to credibly 
state that another participant was in another room sending reports via computer.  Further, when 
debriefing participants at the end of the experiment, none expressed skepticism regarding the 
existence of a real reporter.     
 To ensure that participants fully understood the instructions, they were given several quiz 
questions in which they were asked to say how much money the reporter would earn under 
various circumstances. To motivate performance on the quiz, participants were paid 25 cents for 
each quiz question they answered correctly. When the experimenter was sure that participants 
understood how the reporter earned money in the Common Interests block, 10 experimental trials 
began.  
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 Following the initial Common Interests block, participants were read the instructions for 
the Conflicting Interests condition. Participants were told that their task would be the same as in 
the previous block of trials – to predict the outcome of an unseen coin toss after receiving a 
message from a reporter. Participants were told that while they themselves would still earn 50 
cents for each correctly predicted coin toss and nothing for incorrect predictions, the reporter 
would now earn 50 cents for each incorrect prediction made by the participant. Participants were 
given a brief quiz about how much money the reporter would earn under various circumstances, 
and were paid 25 cents for each correctly answered quiz question. When the experimenter was 
sure the participant understood how the reporter earned money, 10 Conflicting Interests trials 
began. 
 Following the initial Conflicting Interests trials, participants were read the instructions for 
the Penalty for Lying block. Participants were told that as in the previous (Conflicting Interests) 
block, the reporter earned 50 cents for each of the participant’s incorrect predictions, while the 
participant would earn 50 cents for each correct prediction. Participants were also told that every 
time the reporter sent a false report, $1 would be deducted from the reporter’s earnings. 
Participants were given a brief quiz about how much money the reporter would earn under 
various circumstances, and were paid 25 cents for each correctly answered quiz question. When 
the experimenter was sure the participant understood how the reporter earned money, 10 Penalty 
for Lying trials began.   
Once the participants had completed 10 trials for all three conditions, we collected data 
for an additional block of 10 trials in each of our three conditions. In order to control for block 
order effects, half of the participants completed the second block of trials in order 1 (Common 
Interests, Conflicting Interests, Penalty for Lying), while the other half completed the second 
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block of trials in order 2 (Penalty for Lying, Conflicting Interests, and Common Interests).  In 
total, participants completed 20 trials in each of the three conditions. 
In all three conditions (Common Interests, Conflicting Interests, and Penalty for Lying), 
participants were seated in a comfortable chair in front of a computer screen. As shown in Figure 
1, all trials in our experiment began with the text “(Tossing Coin)” appearing in the center of a 
19-inch color monitor for 3 seconds.  Next, the text “Showing outcome to reporter” was 
displayed on the monitor for 5 seconds.  The text “The reporter says” then appeared for 5 
seconds.  These first three prompts appeared on the screen for longer amounts of time (a total of 
13 seconds) than subsequent prompts in order to promote the illusion that another experimenter 
was actually flipping a coin in another room and that another participant (acting as the reporter) 
was actually sending a report.  The reporter’s report was comprised of either a 1 second 
presentation of the word “HEADS” or the word “TAILS.”  Participants were given 6 seconds 
from the onset of the “HEADS/TAILS” prompt to respond.  Response was signaled via a button 
press in which a left hand response indicated HEADS and a right hand response indicated 
TAILS.  This sequence was repeated for each of the 60 trials in our experiment, and on each 
trial, the amount of time that elapsed between the presentation of the “HEADS/TAILS” prompt 
and participants’ responses was recorded.  Participants were not told that their responses were 
being timed, and no feedback was given until the very end of the experiment.2  Participants were 
also told that the reporter would not observe the outcome of individual trials.  
 
                                                 
2
 Because participants were not given feedback about their choices, they could not verify 
whether the reporter’s reports were truthful.  Thus, there was no opportunity for the reporter to 
develop a reputation in our experiments.  This aspect of our experimental design differs from 
those of other scholars, who did allow reputations to develop in their experiments (see, e.g., 
Izuma, Saito, and Sadato 2008; King-Casas et al. 2005; Milinski, Semmann, and Krambeck 
2002; McCabe et al. 2001; Palfrey and Prisbrey 1996; and Andreoni 1988). 
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Figure 1. Sample trial from Experiment 1. 
 
 
RESULTS 
Behavioral Results  
The extent to which participants trusted the reporter’s reports was assessed by examining 
the percentage of times that their predictions were the same as what the reporter reported in each 
experimental condition (i.e. what percentage of the time did participants predict heads when the 
reporter reported heads and predict tails when the reporter reported tails in each experimental 
condition).  One sample t-tests were used to determine whether participants’ predictions matched 
what the reporter reported more than 50% of the time.  A 50% baseline was used because we 
tossed a fair coin; thus, if participants were simply choosing heads or tails randomly, then we 
would expect their predictions to match the reporter’s reports 50% of the time.  If participants 
(Tossing Coin)
Showing
outcome
to reporter
The reporter says
HEADS
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trusted the reporter’s reports, then we should observe their predictions matching the reporter’s 
reports more than 50% of the time.    
As shown in Figure 2, when participants were told that the reporter shared common 
interests with them, their predictions matched what the reporter reported 92% of the time, a 
figure that is significantly greater than our 50% baseline (t = 18.93, p < 0.001).  Similarly, in the 
Penalty for Lying condition, participants’ predictions matched the reporter’s reports 93% of the 
time, which is also significantly greater than 50% (t = 18.99, p < 0.001).  However, in the 
Conflicting Interests condition, participants’ predictions matched what the reporter reported only 
58% of the time.  Although this percentage is significantly greater than our 50% baseline (t = 
2.13; p < 0.05), it is significantly less than the percentage of times that participants’ predictions 
matched the reporter’s reports in the Common Interests and Penalty for Lying conditions (when 
compared to the Common Interests condition:  t = 7.79, p < 0.001; when compared to the Penalty 
for Lying condition: t = 8.03, p < 0.001).  These results are largely consistent with those of Lupia 
and McCubbins (1998).3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Our data was also analyzed with a random effects logit model, and the same results were 
obtained.  The random effects model was used to account for participants making multiple 
choices in each experimental condition.  That the same results were obtained suggests that the 
results are not driven by unobserved individual differences (i.e. the errors appear to be 
approximately Gaussian). 
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Figure 2. Percentage of participants’ predictions that matched the reporter’s reports in the 
Common Interests, Conflicting Interests, and Penalty for Lying conditions in 
Experiments 1 and 2. 
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Reaction Time Results 
The reaction time results were consistent with our behavioral results.  That is, participants 
in the Common Interests and Penalty for Lying conditions took similar amounts of time to 
respond after viewing the “HEADS/TAILS” prompt.  Further, participants in the Conflicting 
Interests condition were slower to respond than were participants in the other two conditions.  
Specifically, participants in the Common Interests condition took, on average, 1191 milliseconds 
to register their response of “heads” or “tails,” while participants in the Penalty for Lying 
condition took, on average, 1157 milliseconds to register their response.  This difference is not 
statistically significant (t = 0.41).  Participants in the Conflicting Interests condition, however, 
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took, on average, 1318 milliseconds to respond, which is significantly slower than participants in 
Penalty for Lying and Common Interests conditions (when compared to the Penalty for Lying 
condition, t = 1.84, p < 0.05; when compared to the Common Interests condition, t = 1.44, p < 
0.1). 
 
DISCUSSION 
Results of Experiment 1 replicate and extend the findings of Lupia and McCubbins 
(1998). Participants’ responses suggest they mirror the information sent by reporters in the 
Common Interests and Penalty for Lying conditions, and largely disregard information sent by 
reporters in the Conflicting Interests condition. Moreover, listeners’ response times were similar 
in the Common Interests and Penalty for Lying conditions, and were reliably faster in these 
blocks than when they received information from reporters with conflicting interests. 
 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 2   
Experiment 1 showed that, behaviorally, participants act similarly on information from 
reporters who share common interests with them and information from reporters who are made 
trustworthy by an external institution, such as a penalty for lying. However, previous research in 
cognitive neuroscience has shown that similar behavioral outcomes can be subserved by different 
neural mechanisms, as for example when older adults engage more brain regions than younger 
adults in order to achieve similar performance levels on perceptual or memory tasks (Grady, et 
al. 1992; Reuter-Lorenz, et al., 2000). Further, whereas reaction times measure the end-point of 
participants’ decision process, event-related brain potentials can provide a measure of various 
perceptual and cognitive processes involved in the generation of participants’ responses.   
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Thus, in Experiment 2, we recorded event-related potentials (ERPs) from listeners in the 
coin toss game in order to investigate the brain’s real-time response to information provided by a 
reporter with common interests, a reporter with conflicting interests, and a reporter who is made 
trustworthy by an external institution, namely a penalty for lying. Our predictions focused on the 
amplitude of the P3 (P3b) component of the ERPs. As a broadly distributed positivity with a 
centro-parietal maximum, the P3 is associated with stimulus evaluation and is typically elicited 
for stimuli that require a binary response (Donchin & Coles, 1988).  
The most influential models of the psychological processes underlying the P3 include 
Johnson’s (1986, 1988) triarchic model and Donchin’s context updating model (Donchin, 1981; 
Donchin & Coles, 1988). In the triarchic model, P3 amplitude is sensitive to subjective 
probability, stimulus meaning, and information transmission. In the context updating model, P3 
amplitude is proportional to the level of uncertainty in participants’ prior expectations about the 
stimulus. In both models, then, P3 amplitude is related to the information value of the stimulus.   
Based on Lupia and McCubbins’s (1998) results and those in Experiment 1, we predicted 
that participants would be more likely to trust the reporter’s statements when the reporter shared 
common interests with them than when the reporter’s interests conflicted with their own, and 
thus reports would elicit a larger P3 response in the Common Interests than the Conflicting 
Interests condition. Further, because Lupia and McCubbins (1998) demonstrated that institutions 
can substitute for common interests, we predicted that the P3 response to reports in the Penalty 
for Lying condition would be similar in amplitude to that in the Common Interests condition. In 
sum, because we assumed that participants would consider the reporter’s reports to be more 
informative in the Common Interests and Penalty for Lying conditions, we expected a larger P3 
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in those conditions than in the Conflicting Interests condition, where participants largely ignore 
the reporter’s reports. 
 
METHODS 
Participants 
 Twelve adults from the University of California, San Diego community (8 men), aged 19 
to 28, were paid based on the decisions that they made in our experiment.  All participants were 
healthy, and they earned, on average, 60 dollars. 
 
Procedure  
The procedure used in Experiment 2 was nearly identical to the procedure used in 
Experiment 1, with the main difference being that participants’ electroencephalogram (EEG) was 
recorded during Experiment 2.  This difference necessitated other minor modifications to the 
procedure used in Experiment 1.  Specifically, participants in Experiment 2 completed the 
experiment one at a time from within an EEG booth, whereas participants in Experiment 1 
completed the experiment in an experimental laboratory that seated between 2 and 6 other 
participants.  Further, after predicting the outcomes of 10 coin tosses in the Common Interests, 
Conflicting Interests, and Penalty for Lying conditions, participants in Experiment 2 participated 
in two additional blocks of 20 trials in each of our three conditions (as opposed to one additional 
block of 10 trials in Experiment 1).  Larger trial numbers were employed in Experiment 2 in 
order to ensure an acceptable signal to noise ratio in the ERPs. Thus, participants in Experiment 
2 completed a total of 50 trials in each of the three conditions (as opposed to 20 trials in each 
condition in Experiment 1).  As in Experiment 1, in order to control for block order effects, half 
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of the participants completed the remaining blocks of trials in order 1 (Common Interests, 
Conflicting Interests, Penalty for Lying), while the other half completed the remaining blocks of 
trials in order 2 (Penalty for Lying, Conflicting Interests, and Common Interests).   
In Experiment 2, participants were seated in a comfortable chair approximately 37 inches 
from a computer screen. All trials began with the text “(Tossing coin)” appearing in the center of 
a 19-inch color monitor for 3 seconds, followed by a variable inter-stimulus interval (ISI) that 
ranged from 4-1000 ms. Variable ISI was employed in Experiment 2 because of the larger 
number of trials that participants completed; that is, because participants predicted the outcomes 
of 150 coin tosses, they likely would have noticed if the experimenter always took the same 
amount of time to flip the coin or if the reporter always took the same amount of time to send his 
or her report.  Thus, in order to promote the illusion that another experimenter was actually 
flipping a coin in another room and that another participant was actually acting as the reporter, 
the amount of time that it took for the coin to be tossed and for the reporter’s reports to appear on 
participants’ computer screen was randomly varied.  Next, the text “Showing Coin Toss 
Outcome to the Reporter” was displayed on the monitor for 5 seconds, followed by a variable ISI 
of 4-1000 ms.  The text “The Reporter Says…” then appeared for 1 second followed by 500 ms 
of blank screen. The reporter’s report was comprised of either a 500 ms presentation of the word 
“HEADS” or the word “TAILS,” followed by a 300 ms ISI.  The reporter’s report of heads or 
tails was followed by a prompt that read, “Your Guess?” for 500 ms.  Participants were given 
4500 ms from the onset of the “Your Guess” prompt to respond. This sequence was repeated for 
each of the 150 trials in Experiment 2, and on each trial, the amount of time that elapsed between 
the presentation of the “Your Guess?” prompt and participants’ responses was recorded.   
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Electroencephalogram Recording and Analysis 
 EEG, sampled at 250 Hz, was collected from 29 tin electrodes arranged in an expanded 
version of the 10-20 system (Nuwer et al., 1998), referenced to the left mastoid.  Blinks and eye 
movements were monitored via an electrode beneath the right eye and one electrode at each of 
the outer canthi (the electrooculogram, EOG).  Average artifact rejection rate was 31% 
(se=17%).  The EEG and EOG were recorded and amplified with a set of 32 bioamplifiers from 
SA Instruments (San Diego, CA), with half-amplitude cut-offs at 0.01 and 40 Hz and digitized 
on a PC.  Informed consent was obtained, and all procedures conformed to ethical requirements 
of the University of California, San Diego. 
ERPs were timelocked to the onset of the reporter’s report in each of the three sorts of 
experimental blocks (Common Interests, Conflicting Interests, and Penalty for Lying). The 100 
ms interval preceding stimulus onset served as the baseline. ERPs were assessed via mean 
amplitude measurements in intervals designed to capture various components of interest (such as 
the N1, P2, and P3 components). Values were subjected to three sorts of repeated measures 
ANOVAs. Midline analyses involved measurements taken from channels FPz, FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz, 
and Oz, and included within-participants factors Trustworthiness (Common Interests, Conflicting 
Interests, and Penalty for Lying) and Electrode Site (6 levels). Medial analyses involved 
measurements taken from channels FP1, F3, FC3, C3, CP3, P3, O1, and their LH counterparts. 
Factors included Trustworthiness (3 levels), Hemisphere (left, right), and Anterior/Posterior (7 
levels). Analogously, lateral analyses involved factors Trustworthiness (3 levels), Hemisphere (2 
levels), and Anterior/Posterior (4 levels), and utilized measurements from channels F7, FT7, 
TP7, T5, and their LH counterparts. Where appropriate, the Huhyn-Feldt correction (Huynh and 
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Feldt 1978) has been applied.  We report corrected p values, but the original degrees of freedom 
have been maintained for clarity. 
 
RESULTS 
Behavioral Results  
As in Experiment 1, the extent to which participants trusted the reporter’s reports was 
assessed by examining the percentage of times that their predictions were the same as what the 
reporter reported in each experimental condition.  One sample t-tests were again used to 
determine whether participants’ predictions matched what the reporter reported more than 50% 
of the time.  As shown in Figure 2, when participants were told that the reporter shared common 
interests with them, their predictions matched what the reporter reported 97% of the time, a 
figure that is significantly greater than our 50% baseline (t = 39.28, p < 0.001).  However, in the 
Conflicting Interests condition where the reporter’s interests conflicted with those of participants, 
participants’ predictions matched what the reporter reported only 39% of the time, which is not 
significantly different from 50% (t = 1.9).  In the Penalty for Lying condition, participants’ 
predictions matched the reporter’s reports 96% of the time, which is significantly greater than 
50% (t = 23.65, p < 0.001).  These results are consistent with those of Lupia and McCubbins 
(1998) and those from Experiment 1.  
 
Reaction Time Results 
 Reaction times were measured from the onset of the “Your Guess” prompt, and analyzed 
with repeated measures ANOVA. In the Common Interests condition, average response time was 
841 ms; in the Conflicting Interests condition, average response time was 910 ms; and, in the 
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Penalty for Lying condition, average response time was 901 ms. Our analysis revealed no effect 
of experimental condition (F(2,22)=.83). The absence of reaction time effects in Experiment 2 is 
likely attributable to our instructions to participants to wait until the “Your Guess” prompt 
appeared before pressing the response button. Intended to minimize the presence of motor 
preparation effects in ERPs to the reporter’s reports (viz. HEADS vs. TAILS), this aspect of our 
design served to decrease the variance in participants’ reaction times. 
 
ERP Results   
Grand average ERPs to the reporter’s reports in each of the three conditions can be seen 
in Figure 3. Prominent portions of the waveform included a negativity peaking approximately 
100 ms post-stimulus over frontal electrodes (the AN1), a frontal positivity peaking 
approximately 200 ms post-stimulus (the P2), a more broadly distributed positivity peaking at 
approximately 500 ms (the P3), a negative-going peak at 600 ms (the medial negativity), and 
subsequent slow wave activity we refer to as the late positive complex (LPC).  
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Figure 3. Grand average ERPs to the reporter’s reports in Common Interests (solid), Conflicting 
Interests (dotted), and Penalty for Lying (dashed) conditions. Negative voltage plotted up.   
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AN1 Component 
 
The anterior N1 component was assessed by measuring the mean amplitude of ERPs 
elicited between 80 and 110 msec post-stimulus. In this portion of the waveform, ERPs to stimuli 
in the Common Interests condition were less negative than ERPs to the stimuli in the other two 
conditions (see Figure 4). Measured at medial sites, the AN1 in the Common Interests condition 
was -0.3 microvolts, versus -1.2 microvolts in the Conflicting Interests condition and -0.7 
microvolts in the Penalty for Lying condition. The interaction between trustworthiness, 
hemisphere, and the anterior-posterior factor (see Table 1) results because the N1 response was 
largest at the anterior medial electrode sites, and was slightly larger over the left hemisphere.  
 
Table 1.  Mean amplitude analysis of the AN1, P2, P3, Medial Negativity, and LPC components,
 measured at midline, medial, and lateral electrode sites.  
 
 
Midline 
Sites 
Medial 
Sites 
Lateral  
Sites 
 
F P F p F p 
N1 
      
Trustworthiness x Hemis x 
Ant-Pos 
N/A N/A F(10, 110) = 3.12 < .05* F(6, 66) = 0.76 NS 
       
P2 
      
Trustworthiness F(2, 22) = 4.63 < .05* F(2, 22) = 3.11 NS F(2, 22) = 6.27 < .01* 
       
P3 
      
Trustworthiness F(2, 22) = 9.14 < .01* F(2, 22) = 6.56 < .01* F(2, 22) = 2.47 NS 
       
Medial Negativity 
      
Trustworthiness F(2, 22) = 9.32 < .01* F(2, 22) = 7 < .01* F(2, 22) = 2.68 NS 
       
LPC 
      
Trustworthiness F(2, 22) = 5.76 < .05* F(2, 22) = 3.48 NS F(2, 22) = 4.45 < .05* 
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Figure 4. Grand average ERPs recorded from the midline frontal (Fz) and parietal (Pz) electrode
 sites in the Common Interests, Conflicting Interests, and Penalty for Lying conditions.
 ERPs are timelocked to the reporter’s reports in each experimental condition.  Negative
 voltage is plotted up.    
 
 
 
 
 
P2 Component 
The P2 component was assessed by measuring the mean amplitude of ERPs between 180 
and 250 ms post-stimulus.  As shown in Table 1, repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main 
— — — — — — Penalty for Lying
-------------------- Conflictinglnterests
Common Interests
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effect of trustworthiness at the midline and lateral electrode sites. ERPs were most positive in the 
Common Interests condition (4.9 microvolts at midline electrodes), compared to 3.63 microvolts 
(at midline electrodes) in the Conflicting Interests condition, and 3.26 microvolts in the Penalty 
for Lying condition.  
 
P3 Component 
The P3 component was assessed by measuring the mean amplitude of ERPs from 400 to 
600 msec post-stimulus.  Analysis suggested that ERPs to stimuli in the Common Interests 
condition were more positive than ERPs to stimuli in either the Conflicting Interests condition or 
the Penalty for Lying condition (see Table 1). Follow-up analysis of data recorded from midline 
sites revealed that the mean amplitude of ERPs in the Common Interests condition was 3.29 
microvolts, which was significantly more positive than 2.27 microvolts in the Penalty for Lying 
condition [F(1, 11) = 5.32, p < 0.05] and more positive than 1.62 microvolts in the Conflicting 
Interests condition [F(1,11)=15.43, p < 0.01].  The amplitude difference between the Penalty for 
Lying and the Conflicting Interests conditions only approached significance [F(1, 11) = 3.35, p = 
0.09].  
 
Medial Negativity 
Medial negativity was examined by measuring the mean amplitude of ERPs from 550 to 
650 msec post-stimulus.  Analysis suggested the mean amplitude of the ERPs was more negative 
in the Conflicting Interests condition than in either the Common Interests or the Penalty for 
Lying conditions (see Table 1). The mean amplitude of ERPs at the midline sites in the 
Conflicting Interests condition was 0.21 microvolts, which was significantly more negative than 
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2.05 microvolts in the Common Interests condition [F(1, 11) = 26.08, p < 0.01] and 1.44 
microvolts in the Penalty for Lying condition [F(1, 11) = 7.92, p < 0.05].4   
 
Late Positive Complex  
The LPC was assessed by measuring the mean amplitude of ERPs from 600 to 900 msec 
post-stimulus.  In this interval, the mean amplitude of ERPs was significantly more positive in 
the Common Interests condition, relative to the Conflicting Interests and the Penalty for Lying 
conditions, at both the midline and lateral sites (see Table 1).  Post hoc comparisons of 
measurements at midline sites revealed that ERPs in the Common Interests condition measured 
3.18 microvolts, which was significantly more positive than 1.92 microvolts in the Conflicting 
Interests condition [F(1, 11) = 11.28, p < 0.01] and 1.73 microvolts in the Penalty for Lying 
condition [F(1, 11) = 6.11, p < 0.05].  The amplitude of the LPC to stimuli in the Conflicting 
Interests and the Penalty for Lying conditions did not reliably differ [midline:  F(1, 11) = 0.21, p 
= 0.65]. 
  
DISCUSSION 
Below we briefly discuss how our manipulation of the social conditions for 
trustworthiness affected the amplitude of ERP components elicited by the reporter’s reports.  
                                                 
4
 In experimental paradigms where the offset of the stimulus precedes a behaviorally significant 
response, stimulus offset is associated with readiness potentials in the ERPs related to response 
preparation (Spantekow, Krappmann, Everling and Flohr, 1999). As stated in the discussion 
section, the medial negativity observed in the present study may be associated with response 
preparation. In fact, both the medial negativity and the late positive complex may have been 
triggered by the stimulus offset, rather than the stimulus onset.  Because of the ambiguity caused 
by the timing of the stimulus offset (which may have triggered ERPs that were convolved with 
the stimulus-generated ERPs), the medial negativity and late positive complex results should be 
interpreted with caution. 
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AN1 Component 
Remarkably, our manipulation of the trustworthiness of the reporter (via the instructions 
in the three different experimental conditions) affected the amplitude of ERP waveforms within 
100 ms of the appearance of the reporter’s report. Although the visually presented stimuli were 
identical in each of the three conditions, the anterior N1 (AN1) was larger in both the Conflicting 
Interests and the Penalty for Lying conditions than it was in the Common Interests condition. 
The AN1 is a negativity peaking over fronto-central electrodes approximately 100 ms after the 
onset of a visually presented stimulus (Luck, 1995). It peaks slightly earlier than the posterior N1 
(or N170), which is also elicited by visual stimuli, but is most prominent at occipito-temporal 
electrode sites (Hillyard & Anllo-Vento, 1998). The amplitude of both visual N1 components is 
modulated by attention, being larger for stimuli in attended than unattended locations (Clark & 
Hillyard, 1996). But while the posterior N1 has been shown to index visual discrimination 
processes, enhanced amplitude of the AN1 has been argued to reflect anticipatory motor 
processes related to response preparation (Vogel & Luck, 2000).  
Enhanced AN1 observed here to stimuli presented in the Conflicting Interests and Penalty 
for Lying conditions indicates that participants’ brains processed the reporter’s reports 
differently in the Common Interests condition, relative to the other two conditions.  This 
processing difference may result from greater anticipatory activity in the former two conditions, 
as opposed to enhanced visual attention. This suggests that participants in the Common Interests 
condition may have attempted to more fully process the reporter’s reports before preparing their 
response. 
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P2 Component 
Similarly, the P2 component was larger in the Common Interests condition than in the 
other two conditions. Although the functional significance of this component is not completely 
agreed upon, the P2 has been argued to reflect some aspect of high-level perceptual processing 
(Kranczioch, Debner, & Engel, 2003).  In target detection paradigms, the P2 is larger for targets 
than non-targets as defined by a variety of visual features (Hillyard & Muente, 1984; Kenemans, 
Kok, & Smulders, 1993), leading to the suggestion that it indexes a multi-dimensional feature 
detection process (Luck & Hillyard, 1994).  Noting that the P2 is similarly modulated in overt 
and covert target detection paradigms, others have suggested it is primarily sensitive to the task 
relevance of perceptual information, and consequently argued that the P2 indexes the integration 
of motivational and perceptual information (Potts, 2004; Potts, Patel, & Azam, 2004; Potts, 
Martin, Burton, & Montague, 2006). The enhanced P2 that we observed in the Common Interests 
condition is thus consistent with our claim that participants’ brains processed the reporter’s 
reports differently in the Common Interests condition, relative to both the Penalty for Lying and 
Conflicting Interests conditions.  It may also indicate that the reporter’s report was more 
perceptually and motivationally salient in the Common Interests condition, relative to the other 
two conditions.   
P3 and LPC Components 
Contrary to our expectations, participants exhibited a significantly larger P3 response 
when they were exposed to a reporter who shared common interests with them, relative to when 
they were exposed to a reporter who was subject to a penalty for lying or who had conflicting 
interests with them.  Interestingly (and unexpectedly), the size of the P3 response was more 
similar in the Penalty for Lying and Conflicting Interests conditions than in the Penalty for Lying 
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and Common Interests conditions.  An identical pattern of results was found for the LPC. We 
discuss these results further in the General Discussion. 
Medial Negativity 
The only ERP component that showed the predicted pattern of a similar response for the 
Common Interests and the Penalty for Lying conditions, i.e., the two in which participants 
behaved similarly, was the negative waveform evident 550-650 ms post-onset that we have 
dubbed the medial negativity. In this interval, reports in the Conflicting Interests condition 
elicited more negative ERPs over centro-parietal electrodes than did reports in the other two 
conditions. Given its timing during the interval between the report and the response prompt, it 
may reflect participants’ preparation to respond to actionable information.   
 
 
 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The present study addressed the brain’s real-time response to information conveyed by 
reporters whose trustworthiness was determined by social conditions. We did so by recording 
reaction times (Experiment 1) and event-related potentials (Experiment 2) from participants who 
played the role of listeners in Lupia and McCubbins (1998) coin toss game. In this game, 
participants guess the outcome of an unseen coin toss after they receive information from an 
anonymous reporter who knows the outcome of the coin toss, but is under no obligation to 
communicate it truthfully. ERPs were timelocked to the onset of the reporter’s report.  We 
expected to observe similar ERP responses to stimuli in the Common Interests and Penalty for 
Lying conditions, where the reporter’s reports were presumed to be trustworthy, and that both 
would differ from ERPs to stimuli in the Conflicting Interests condition. Further, because reports 
in the Common Interests and Penalty for Lying conditions were presumed to be more 
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informative than those in the Conflicting Interests condition, we predicted the latter would elicit 
a smaller amplitude P3 (P3b) than the other two conditions.   
Results, however, indicated that while participants behaved as if reporters in the Common 
Interests and Penalty for Lying conditions were equally trustworthy, their brain response 
suggested that they processed reports differently in these two conditions. As can be seen in 
Figure 2, participants in both the Common Interests and Penalty for Lying conditions almost 
always based their predictions on the reporter’s report, while participants apparently ignored the 
reports in the Conflicting Interests condition. Further, participants’ reaction times were similar in 
the Common Interests and Penalty for Lying conditions and were faster than participants’ 
reaction times in the Conflicting Interests condition.  However, P3 amplitude was larger for 
reports in the Common Interests condition than it was for the other two conditions. In fact, P3 
amplitude to reports in the Penalty for Lying condition was more similar to that of the 
Conflicting Interests condition than to the Common Interests condition.5 
Based purely on the behavioral responses, one might conclude that our participants were 
equally likely to trust a reporter who shared common interests with them and a reporter who was 
made trustworthy by an institution, namely a penalty for lying. In contrast, ERPs to the reporter’s 
report in the Common Interests condition tended to differ from both the Conflicting Interests 
condition (as predicted) and from the Penalty for Lying condition (contrary to our expectations).  
Given the relatively small sample size in the ERP experiment, the significant differences we 
observed between the Common Interests condition and the other two conditions are quite 
                                                 
5
 Our failure to observe statistically significant P3 amplitude differences between the Penalty for 
Lying and the Conflicting Interests conditions (p = 0.09) likely reflects power limitations of our 
relatively small sample size (N = 12). This was not the case, however, for the more robust 
differences between the Common Interests condition and each of the other two conditions. 
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remarkable.  Indeed, the small sample size increases the risk of a type II error (that is, failing to 
observe a difference between two conditions when there is in fact a difference between them).  
The fact that reports in the Common Interests condition elicited a larger P3 component 
than in the Penalty for Lying condition may reflect the fact that participants perceived reports 
from the common interest reporter to be slightly more informative than those in the Penalty for 
Lying condition. Taken together, these results indicate that participants’ brains differentially 
processed information in the Common Interests condition, relative to the other two conditions.  
More broadly, these results may reflect different attentional processes resulting from the target in 
the three conditions.  
 As for the implications of these results, they indicate that even when socially transmitted 
information induces similar behavior, it may be processed differently depending on the manner 
in which the source is made trustworthy.  Specifically, even though the reporter was, 
theoretically and behaviorally, equally trustworthy in the Common Interests and Penalty for 
Lying conditions, participants processed information differently when it came from a reporter 
who was trustworthy by virtue of sharing common interests with them versus a reporter who was 
made trustworthy by an external institution.  In this way, our results suggest that even though 
institutions substitute for common interests behaviorally, they are not necessarily cognitive 
substitutes for common interests.  Of course, the question of whether and when the cognitive 
differences that we observed lead to changes in citizens’ propensity to trust others is an empirical 
question that should be explored in future research.     
 32
REFERENCES 
Andreoni, J. (1988). Why free ride?  Strategies and learning in public goods experiments.
 Journal of Public Economics, 37, 291-304. 
Boudreau, C. (2006). Jurors are competent cue-takers:  How institutions substitute for legal
 sophistication. International Journal of Law in Context, 2(3), 293-304. 
Clark, V.P. & Hillyard, S.A. (1996). Spatial selective attention affects early extrastriate but not 
striate components of the visual evoked potentials. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 8: 
387-402. 
Crawford, V. & Sobel, J. (1982). Strategic information transmission. Econometrica, 50, 1431-
 1451. 
De Quervain, D. J. F., Fischbacher, U., Treyer, V., Schellhammer, M., Schnyder, U., et al. 
(2004). The neural basis of altruistic punishment. Science 305, 1254-1259. 
Delgado, M. R., Frank, R. H., & Phelps, E. A. (2005). Perceptions of moral character modulate 
the neural systems of reward during the trust game. Nature Neuroscience 8, 1611-1618. 
Donchin, E. (1981). Surprise!...Surprise? Psychophysiology 18: 493-513. 
Donchin, E. and Coles, M. (1988). Is the P300 component a manifestation of context updating?
 Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11: 357-427. 
Grady, C. L., et al. (1992). Dissociation of object and spatial vision in human extrastriate cortex: 
Age-related changes in activation of regional cerebral blood flow measured with [15O] 
water and positron emission tomography. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 4, 23-34. 
Hillyard, S.A. & Anllo-Vento, L. (1998). Event-related brain potentials in the study of visual 
selective attention. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 95: 781-787. 
 33
Hillyard, S. A., & Muente, T. (1984). Selective attention to color and location: An analysis with 
event-related brain potentials. Perception & Psychophysics, 36, 185-198. 
Huynh, H., & Feldt, L. S. (1978). Estimation of the box correction for degrees of freedom from
 sample data in the randomized block and split plot designs. Journal of Educational
 Statistics, 1, 69-82. 
Izuma, K., Saito, D. N., & Sadato, N. (2008). Processing of social and monetary rewards in the
 human striatum. Neuron, 58, 284-294. 
Johnson, R., Jr. (1986). A triarchic model of P300 amplitude. Psychophysiology 23: 211-224. 
Johnson, R. (1988). The amplitude of the P300 component of the event-related potential: Review
 and synthesis. In P. Ackles, JR Jennings, & MGH Coles (Eds.), Advances in
 Psychophysiology: A research annual, Vol 3 (pp. 69-137). Greenwich, CT: JA1 Press,
 Inc. 
Kenemans, J., Kok, A., & Smulders, F. (1993). Event-related potentials to conjunctions of spatial 
frequency and orientation as a function of stimulus parameters and response 
requirements. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 88, 51-63. 
King-Casas B., Tomlin D., Anen C., Camerer C. F., Quartz S. R., Montague P. R. (2005) Getting 
to know you: Reputation and trust in a two-person economic exchange. Science 308, 78–
83. 
Knutson B., & Bossaerts P. (2007) Neural antecedents of financial decisions. Journal of 
Neuroscience 27, 8174–8177. 
Kosfeld, M., Heinrichs, M., Zak, P. J., Fischbacher, U., & Fehr, E. (2005). Oxytocin increases 
trust in humans. Nature 435, 673-676. 
 34
Kranczioch, C, Debner, S., & Engel, A. (2003). Event-related potential of the attentional blink 
phenomenon.  Cognitive Brain Research 17, 177-187. 
Luck, S. J. (1995). Multiple mechanisms of visual-spatial attention: Recent evidence from human 
electrophysiology. Behavioral Brain Research 71, 113-123. 
Luck, S. J., & Hillyard, S. A. (1994). Electrophysiological correlates of feature analysis during 
visual search. Psychophysiology, 31(3), 291-308. 
Lupia, A. (1992). Busy voters, agenda control, and the power of information. American
 Political Science Review, 86, 390-404. 
Lupia, A. (1994). Shortcuts versus encyclopedias: Information and voting behavior in California 
insurance reform elections. American Political Science Review, 88, 63-76.  
Lupia, A. & McCubbins, M. D. (1998). The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What
 They Need to Know? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
McCabe, K., Houser, D., Ryan, L., Smith, V., & Trouard, T. (2001). A functional imaging study
 of cooperation in two-person reciprocal exchange. Proceedings of the National Academy
 of Sciences 98, 11832-11835. 
Milinski, M., Semmann, D., & Krambeck, H. J. (2002). Reputation helps solve the “tragedy of
 the commons.” Nature, 415, 424-426. 
Mondak, J. J. (1993). Source cues and policy approval:  The cognitive dynamics of public 
support for the Reagan agenda. American Journal of Political Science, 37, 186-212. 
Nuwer, M., Comi, G., Emerson, R., Fuglsang-Frederiksen, A., Guerit, J.-M., Hinrichs, H., & 
Rappelsburger, P. (1998). IFCN standards for digital recording of clinical EEG. 
Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 106, 259-261. 
 35
Palfrey, T. R. & Prisbrey, J. E. (1996). Altruism, reputation, and noise in linear public goods 
experiments. Journal of Public Economics, 61, 409-427. 
Potts, G.F. (2004). An ERP index of task relevance evaluation of visual stimuli. Brain & 
Cognition 56: 5-13. 
Potts, G.F., Patel, S.H., & Azzam, P.N. (2004). Impact of instructed relevance on the visual ERP. 
International Journal of Psychophysiology 52, 197-209. 
Potts, G.F., Martin, L.E., Burton, P. & Montague, P.R. (2006). When things are better or worse 
than expected: The medial frontal cortex and the allocation of processing resources. 
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 18: 1112-1119. 
Reuter-Lorenz, P.A., et al. (2000). Age differences in the frontal lateralization of verbal and 
spatial working memory revealed by PET. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 12, 174-
187. 
Rilling, J. K., Gutman, D. A., Zeh, T. R., Pagnoni, G., Berns, G. S., Kilts, C. D. (2002). A neural 
basis for social cooperation. Neuron 35, 395-405. 
Rilling, J. K., Sanfey, A. G., Aronson, J. A., Nystrom, L. E., and Cohen, J. D. (2004). Opposing 
BOLD responses to reciprocating and unreciprocated altruism in putative reward 
pathways. Neuroreport 15, 2539-2543. 
Sanfey, A. G., Rilling, J. K., Aronson, J. A., Nystrom, L. E., Cohen, J. D. (2003). The neural 
basis of economic decision-making in the Ultimatum Game. Science 300, 1755-1758. 
Sniderman, P. M., Brody, R. A., & Tetlock, P. E. (1991). Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in 
Political Psychology.  New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 36
Spantekow, A., Krappmann, P., Everling, S. and Flohr, H. (1999). Event-related potentials and
 saccadic reaction times: Effects of fixation point offset or change. Experimental Brain
 Research 127: 291-297. 
Vogel, E.K. and Luck, S.J. (2000). The visual N1 component as an index of a discrimination 
process. Psychophysiology 37: 190-203. 
Wickens, J. R., Horvitz, J. C., Costa, R. M., Killcross, S. (2007) Dopaminergic mechanisms in 
actions and habits. J Neurosci 27, 8181–8183. 
Zak, P. J., Kurzban, R., & Matzner, W. T. (2004). The neurobiology of trust. Ann. NY Acad. Sci. 
1032, 224-227.  
